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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The results of the December 2011 Russian parliamentary elections, which reinstated the 
incumbent United Russia Party, catalyzed the gathering of tens of thousands of Russians who 
denied the election results and accused the government of corrupt vote-rigging practices.  These 
protests were further mobilized by the March 2012 election, which re-elected Vladimir Putin for 
his third presidential term.  Individuals filled the streets in discontent as they accused the Russian 
government of corruption in addition to expressing many other grievances that they had.  
Numerous eyes were focused on Russia as many pondered what was to come as they watched 
these events unfold.  Some questioned if these protests would incite a revolution and result in the 
complete overthrow of the semi-authoritarian Russian government.  Until then, Putin had long 
been praised for bringing Russia out of economic hardship when he first attained the presidential 
seat in 2000 and this economic success helped him secure popular approval during his first two 
presidential terms.  The 2008 Russian economic crisis had left many citizens dissatisfied and 
Putin could no longer rely upon economic performance to garner popular support going into his 
third presidential term.  Amidst the “Stop Putinism” protest signs and the “Russia without Putin” 
chants denouncing his right to rule, Putin began his third presidential term with the immense task 
of resolving these challenges to his legitimacy.  Fast-forward four years to today’s Russia and 
you will notice a completely different scene entirely.  The tens of thousands of disgruntled 
Russian citizens that once clamored for a “Russia Without Putin” no longer fill the streets and 
the large protests have subsided as Vladimir Putin currently sits comfortably inside the Kremlin 
with increasingly high levels of popular support.  Not only has Putin been able to successfully 
overcome the threat to his presidency, but he has somehow also managed to maintain this 
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support against the backdrop of a failing economy and continued authoritarian government 
practices.   How exactly has Putin been able to restore and maintain his legitimacy in the eyes of 
the Russian people as many of the protester's original grievances continue to remain unresolved?  
This is the political phenomenon that motivates this thesis and the purpose of this study is to 
present a plausible theory that aims to explain Putin’s ability to recover and successfully secure 
his legitimacy.   
My theoretical argument states that the 2011-2012 protests were the events that prompted 
Putin to change his legitimization strategy from that which could be described as performance-
based legitimacy to what can now be described as value-based legitimacy.  During Putin’s first 
two presidential terms, the Russian population may not have been entirely satisfied with the 
controls of the semi-authoritarian system, but seemed to at least be content with the improved 
quality of life that they had experienced as a result of economic progress.  Putin’s third term is 
therefore distinct from his previous years of rule because in the absence of economic prosperity, 
he was forced to seek new methods that would convince the population of his right to rule.  I 
argue that he was able to accomplish this task by appealing to common values such as Russian 
nationalism and elements of Russian traditionalism as a legitimacy enhancer that would 
compensate for the lack of government performance.  Exploiting elements present within 
Russian political culture helps Putin and his political party portray their commitment to the 
Russian population’s interests.  With actions rooted within these particular appeals, he is able to 
successfully deflect from his inability to produce an authentic liberal democratic system and his 
inability to improve economic performance.  Therefore, I believe that through the promotion of 
these legitimizing cultural appeals and ideologies, Putin has been able to demonstrate that he is 
still interested in improving the quality of life of Russian citizens despite the failing economy 
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and continuous authoritarian controls.  The manipulation of nationalist identity politics and 
political culture work to his advantage to convince the public of why he is fit to lead Russia as a 
nation-state.   
In this thesis, empirical methods will be employed and Russia will be used as a case 
study in order to understand the theoretical basis for how a semi-authoritarian government can 
restore and maintain legitimacy when its rule is under scrutiny.  The research question that I just 
presented is important because the concept of legitimacy can be used as a socio-political contract 
that binds political and social systems.  Understanding the case of Russia as a political 
phenomenon will provide insight on legitimization techniques that can be employed when 
positions of authority are under threat in order to restore the socio-political contract that grants 
the right to rule.   This study is significant because it contributes to ongoing discourse regarding 
methods of legitimization and is relevant to current events occurring in Russia today.  This study 
is likely to appeal to scholars interested in understanding the mystique regarding Putin’s 
consolidation of power.  This study can also potentially interest those who participated in the 
2011-2012 anti-Putin protest movement and increase their consciousness regarding the current 
source of Putin’s support base in order to form a stronger oppositional front in the future.   
Drawing from previous research on legitimacy, nationalist ideology, and popular support 
for semi-authoritarian regimes, this thesis offers value-based legitimacy as an explanation for 
Putin’s ability to overcome threats to his rule.  In the following sections, I will first provide a 
definition of terms that will be utilized throughout this study.  Then, I will provide a brief 
historical background on Putin’s first two presidential terms in order to provide perspective on 
the unique nature of his third term.  Next, an examination of previous literature that relate to this 
study will be presented to provide the framework in which this study will be conducted.  Then, I 
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will present a theory that aims to explain how Putin has been able to restore and maintain his 
legitimacy in his third presidential term.  Afterwards, strategies employed by Putin to enhance 
his legitimacy will undergo a brief analysis in order to examine how they are rooted in nationalist 
ideology and Russian traditionalism.  Then, I will describe the methods employed in this study 
and then presents the results of my empirical analysis.  Finally, I will conclude with statements 
on these results and comment on projections for future research in relation to this study. 
 
     Definition of Terms: 
In order to understand the framework in which I will be conducting my research, I 
must explain certain key concepts.  I shall begin by trying to define legitimacy as it pertains to 
this study.  The concept of legitimacy crosses several disciplines such as psychology, sociology 
and political science.1  Due to the numerous applications of this term, I will use a definition 
presented by Mark Suchman in his journal article, “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and 
Institutional Approaches.”  According to Suchman, “Legitimacy is a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.”2  In other words an entity is 
considered legitimate as long as his or her actions are in accord with the preferences of the 
subjects under his or her rule.  Legitimacy is important because trying to govern a society based 
upon the possession of power alone requires enormous expenditures of resources to coerce 
individuals to producing desired behavior.3  Therefore, it works to the benefit of an authoritative 
                                                
1 Wiechnik, Stan.  “Political Legitimacy and Values.” (Small Wars Journal (2013)) 1.  
2Wiechnik 574.  
3 Tyler, Tom R. “Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation.” Annual Review of Psychology   
(2006) 377.  
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figure to cultivate a belief in his or her legitimacy in order to secure desired behavior through the 
willing consent of constituents.4  Despite the fact that many scholars remain divided upon the 
sources of legitimacy, this study will focus on the following two sources exclusively:  
performance and value-based legitimacy.   
         Performance legitimacy is self-explanatory in the sense that this form of legitimacy is 
derived from the government’s performance and ability to improve the quality of life of its 
citizens.  Subjects determine whether or not the government is credible based upon their 
assessment of the government’s actions in this regard.  On the other hand, value-based 
legitimacy is a form of legitimacy that is not directly derived from government performance but 
is instead rooted in government appeals to certain internalized values.  Value-based legitimacy 
therefore is derived from appealing to some commonly held value systems of the population 
concerning the normative appropriateness of government official behavior.5  These appeals foster 
the perception that government behavior is valid because its actions seem to be in accord with 
citizen preferences.  Therefore, nationalism and other sources of Russian pride such as 
traditionalism, shall be examined as sources of value-based legitimacy within the context of this 
study.   
Why Nationalism and Russian Traditionalism? 
Nationalism and Russian traditionalism have legitimating effects because they help create 
a consensus between rulers and members of the nation on mutual aspirations and obligations.6  
These two concepts bind the state and society in a collective consciousness based on a sense of 
                                                
4 Tyler 377.  
5 Levi, Margaret, and Audrey Sacks. “Legitimating Beliefs: Sources and Indicators.” Regulation & Governance   
(2009) 354.  
6 Tuminez, Astrid S. Russian Nationalism since 1856: Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy. (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000) 2.  
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political loyalty to the nation-state and cultural belonging to that community.7  Therefore, Putin 
can appeal to the population with actions that cultivate a sense of pride in being part of the 
Russian nation.   
It is also important for me to state the degree of inclusion implied when I use the term 
“nationalism” because I am aware that it can take either a civic or ethnic form.8  Within the 
context of this study, the term “nationalism” implies the civic and more inclusive form due to the 
fact that Putin has acknowledged how an overtly exclusive form of nationalism could pose a 
danger to Russia’s fragile multiethnic social fabric.9    
Also, for the sake of simplicity in the remainder of this thesis, the term “nationalism” will 
also imply Russian traditionalism.  This is because nationalism is a discourse of political culture 
that can also draw from elements of national history and tradition.10  National identity is 
embedded in the nation’s common historical past and the incumbent regime can appeal to a 
collective historical memory, which can then be exploited and manipulated to the government’s 
advantage.11  This allows political mobilization around the creation of a commemorative 
discourse of a national history mythologized by the incumbent regime to legitimize the 
nationalistic aspiration for a shared destiny on the basis of the common past.12  More 
specifically, exhibiting a commitment to restoring Russia as the powerful force that it once was, 
especially on the international stage is a nationalist aspiration that has much appeal to the 
                                                
7 Liao, Ning. “Bringing Ideology Back In: Chinese Nationalism Contextualized in the Legitimacy Enhancement of 
an Authoritarian Regime.” 357.  
8 Laruelle, Marlene. Russian Nationalism and the National Reassertion of Russia. [(S.l.]: Routledge, 2009) 3.   
9 Sakwa, Richard. Putin Redux: Power and Contradiction in Contemporary Russia. Abingdon, Oxon  ; (Burlington, 
VT: Routledge, 2014) 200.  
10 Liao 357.  
11 Liao 358.  
12 Liao 358. 
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Russian population.13  The government’s ability to pursue society’s nationalist passions arouses 
an affectionate feeling within the populace toward the regime and this can help the government 
overcome challenges to its legitimacy.  It is also important for me to note that this work 
acknowledges the fact that there isn’t always unity in the phenomenon of nationalism but 
recognizes its ability to establish unity in its constructed nature.14   
 
        Brief Historical Context:  
This brief historical examination of Vladimir Putin’s tenure as president will explain the 
circumstances behind his rise to power and also enables one to distinguish historical continuities 
and discontinuities in current Russian policy.   
In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had defaulted on its debt, salaries 
for public sector workers and pensions were being paid months late, and basic infrastructure was 
collapsing.15  Russia’s economy had declined by 40 percent during the early part of the 1990’s 
and had suffered financial collapse by 1998.16  As a result, Putin’s main domestic policy 
initiative in his first presidential term was to restore economic stability in Russia by 
implementing economic reforms policies meant to reduce inflation and help the economy.17  Not 
too long after he began his presidency, there were unprecedented universal price hikes in oil and 
gas.18  Russia was a major exporter of these strategic commodities, and these price hikes greatly 
helped to sustain its economic recovery.19  At the beginning of 2007, Russia’s gross domestic 
                                                
13  Liao 361. 
14 Laruelle 3. 
15 Bullough, Oliver. “Vladimir Putin: The Rebuilding of ‘Soviet’ Russia.” BBC News. N.p., 27 Apr. 2014.  
16 Dresen,  Joseph. “Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia.” Wilon Center. N.p., n.d. Print. 
17 Dresen  
18 Dresen 
19 Dresen 
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product (GDP) finally returned to the same level as in 1990, the penultimate year of communist 
power.20  The country had six straight years of growth, averaging 6 percent per year and in 
addition to the oil and gas influx, there was a strong increase in domestic household 
consumptions, complete repayment of public foreign debt, a doubling of spending on education, 
and a tripling of spending on health over the course of Putin’s first two terms in power.21  The 
rising oil and gas prices in addition to rising living standards had served as the buttress of Putin’s 
popularity during his first two terms from the years 2000 to 2008.  Economic success seems to be 
one of the main contributors to his popularity because Russia under Putin existed as a restrictive 
and controlled democracy but he still managed to remain popular despite these controls.  Putin 
was praised for bringing Russia out of stagnation and into a new era of progress and it was this 
incredible performance that was the source of his legitimacy during his first two terms.  Putin 
had come to embody Russia’s “recovery” and although he is not solely responsible for the 
amelioration of the country’s economic situation, he has been able to turn this situation to his 
advantage in the political realm.22  
After his success, Putin was limited to two successive terms by the Russian constitution 
and his nominated successor, Medvedev, was elected while Putin took the position of Prime 
Minister in 2008.23  Putin and the United Russia Party had hand-picked and endorsed Dmitry 
Medvedev, who essentially represented the Putin system while modifying some of its features.24  
Medvedev won the presidency with 70.3 percent of the vote, most likely because many saw him 
                                                
20 Laruelle 7.  
21 Laruelle 7. 
22 Laruelle 7. 
23 Sakwa 4.  
24 Sakwa 4. 
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as a surrogate to Putin.25  The Russian economy took a blow after Medvedev was elected and the 
citizens of Russia suffered hardships that left the population increasingly dissatisfied.  When 
Putin reassumed the presidential seat in 2012, he was met with disgruntled protesters and 
although initial reports of the immediate causes of the protests were credited to be cries of 
fraudulence and falsification of parliamentary elections, many believe that the roots of this 
protest movement go far deeper.       
 
       2011-2012 Protests:  
 
On December 5, 2011, up to 10,000 protesters gathered on Chistoprudny Boulevard in 
Moscow to condemn fraud in the parliamentary ballot and then it gained pace when 100,000 
participated in the December 24th protests also condemning the practices of a “managed 
democracy.”26  The main slogan was “Russia without Putin” while placards with the words 
“Putin is a thief” were also prevalent.27  According to Levada-Center surveys, the protest 
movement was overwhelmingly young and middle class.  Although there was a middle class 
majority, there were also many students, pensioners, and poverty-stricken individuals that 
participated in the protests.28  
 Issues of the socio-political nature were what prompted the fall in popularity of Russia’s 
leader and public outcry against his rule.29  Even though the immediate reasons for protest were 
fraudulent vote-counting that ultimately allowed the United Russia party to preserve its majority 
in the State Duma, the dissatisfaction with the regime was much deeper as protesters raised a 
                                                
25 Rose, Richard. Popular Support for an Undemocratic Regime: The Changing Views of Russians. Cambridge  ;  
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 134.  
 
26 Sakwa 120.  
27 Sakwa 120. 
28 Sakwa 122.  
29 Makarychev, A. S., and André Mommen, eds. Russia’s Changing Economic and Political Regimes: The Putin  
Years and Afterwards. (New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2013) 3.  
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whole gamut of issues that reached far beyond that particular campaign, including demands for 
greater transparency, accountability, good governance, civil rights, etc.30  These protesters were 
frustrated with the regime’s structural ineffectiveness in delivering public goods and providing 
social justice and fair governing practices.31  A lack of trust developed between the ruling elite 
and the rest of Russian society as a result.32  Makarychev and Mommen also present another 
theory as to why the protests erupted.  They claim that, “the roots of the widespread public 
discontent date back to September 2011, when at the United Russia party convention Medvedev 
not only refused to run for his second presidential tenure, but instead proposed this job to Putin 
in exchange for securing his own appointment as the next prime minister.”33  Makarychev and 
Mommen argue that despite Medvedev’s reputation as Putin’s marionnette, a significant part of 
Russian society still perceived him as a moderate alternative to Putin’s hard-line policy of state 
centralization.  Medvedev’s voluntary self-removal from the presidential race symbolized for 
many the end of their hopes for modernization and for a more liberal political regime in Russia.34  
Also, the promises of liberalization of the political system and modernization of the Russian 
economy that were made during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency were not fulfilled and many 
Russians felt deceived when they found out that Putin would be returning to his post as 
president.35  Russians were simply angered by the overt manipulation of electoral procedure, as 
                                                
30 Makarychev and Mommen 1.   
31 Makarychev and Mommen 3.   
32 Makarychev and Mommen 3.   
33 Makarychev and Mommen 2.   
34 Makarychev and Mommen 2.   
35 Gelʹman, Vladimir. Reexamining Economic and Political Reforms in Russia, 1985-2000: Generations, Ideas, and  
Changes. (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2014) 127.  
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exemplified by the clandestine agreements between Putin and Medvedev, and by the large scale 
voter fraud that the government had been condemned for conducting.36 
Unlike the Russian street protesters in the 1990’s who protested their inability to feed 
their families as a result of joblessness, the discontent of the 2011-2012 protests was mostly 
spread across Russia’s middle class who had a higher degree of education, expectations and 
demands as to the quality of governance that they sought after.37  Stability and order were the 
key signifiers in Putin’s lexicon at the beginning of his first presidential term, but now in the 
absence of economic prosperity, issues concerning the quality of government performance and 
corruption were finally being raised.38   
Gel'man, Travin, and Marganiya argue that these protests also reveal that there was a 
change in the informal “social contract” between the authorities and society.39  According to 
these authors, “in previous years, Russian authorities provided Russian citizens with a rise of 
their well-being and material prosperity in exchange for passive loyalty and non-intervention in 
politics, in the wake of mass protests this contract was if not broken, then at least put into 
question.”40  The breakdown of this social contract was due to a shift in public opinion 
influenced by changing perceptions of socioeconomic problems, predominantly as a 
consequence of the 2008-2009 crisis and the absence of economic prosperity resulted in 
disillusionment with government corruption and other abuses of authority.41   
This is why I argue that value-based legitimacy was what Putin resorted to in order to 
repair the damaged social contract and distract the population from persisting domestic issues.  
                                                
36 Gelʹman 2.  
37 Makarychev and Mommen 4.   
38 Makarychev and Mommen 17.   
39 Makarychev and Mommen 127.   
40 Makarychev and Mommen 127.   
41 Makarychev and Mommen 127.   
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What follows is a review of existing literature on concepts that will provide the context in which 
my theoretical analysis will be built upon.  
 
Chapter 2: Popular Mobilization under Authoritarianism  
 In this section I will analyze what we know about the nature of legitimacy, nationalist 
mobilization, and popular support for a semi-authoritarian regime.  The purpose of this literature 
review is to present existing theories regarding these concepts from major scholarly works and 
then relate these theories to my examination of Russia as a case study.  The works present within 
this literature review will provide insight on current on-going conversations concerning themes 
that are integral to this study.  The key findings within the seven works that I will present will 
then be synthesized in order to draw connections between the various research studies and form 
the foundation upon which I will be conducting my own research. 
 
      Legitimacy 
The process of legitimization is a well-studied topic in political science research.  There 
are several varying theories concerning sources of legitimacy and many find their roots in the 
original work of Max Weber concerning issues of power and legitimacy.  Wolfgang Mommsen’s 
book, The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber: Collected Essays, presents a well-known 
essay written by Weber entitled, “The Three Types of Legitimate Rule”, in which Weber reveals 
what he believes to be three ideal types of legitimate political authority. These three types of 
legitimacy vary in the manner that citizens are lead to believe in a leader’s right to rule.  One 
type of legitimacy is described as legal authority, in which citizen obedience is demanded by 
virtue of a set of legal rules and laws.  Citizens hold respect for the legal and administrative 
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institutions that are in place and therefore view the office holder as having legitimacy because 
they respect the position that the authority has, but not necessarily because they respect the 
officeholder himself.  Legal authority is not rooted in the individual officeholder but is instead 
rooted in belief of the legitimacy of the rules and laws that have created the specific position of 
authority.  The second source of legitimacy is traditional authority, which finds the roots of 
legitimacy in the citizen’s reverence for traditional practices.  This type of legitimacy is not 
rooted in elections, but is often found in hereditary systems of rule that have long existed within 
a specific society.  The officeholder within this system tends to retain legitimacy regardless of 
the individual’s ability to rule.  The final categorization of authority is charismatic authority and 
is the only categorization that is actually rooted in the characteristics of the individual 
officeholder.  Instead of a focus on legality or tradition, the ruler’s legitimacy is rooted in the 
individual’s charisma and appealing personality which is able to win over the citizen’s approval 
to attain legitimacy.  These are the three categorizations that many scholars have used to form 
the basis of their studies regarding the nature of legitimacy, but David Beetham argues that this 
approach does not sufficiently portray the multi-faceted nature of legitimacy as a concept.   
In his book, The Legitimation of Power, David Beetham responds to the Weberian 
concept of legitimacy and presents what he believes to be present conceptual fallacies within 
Weber’s categorical framework of legitimacy.  In his book, Beetham acknowledges that although 
the Weberian conception is accurate to an extent, he argues that Weber fails to acknowledge the 
multi-dimensional nature of legitimacy.42  Beetham argues that Weber’s threefold typology of 
legitimate authority has caused social scientists since Weber to force every example of 
legitimacy into these 3 categories.  He argues that this typology elevates each of the contributory 
                                                
42 Beetham, David. The Legitimation of Power. 2nd Edition. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 23.  
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elements of legitimacy (sanctity of tradition, rule-conformity, and the charismatic qualities of the 
individual leader) into a separate self-sufficient type of legitimacy and this fails to recognize that 
each is just one element of a totality.  Beetham proposes an alternative approach to the subject by 
presenting three conditions that he believes need to be fulfilled in order for a power to be 
considered legitimate: 1) its conformity to established rules, 2) the justifiability of the rules by 
reference to shared beliefs, 3) the express consent, of the subordinate, or of the most significant 
among them, to the particular relations of power.  David Beetham also believes that enhanced 
order, stability, and effectiveness are better ways to assess legitimacy in comparison to Weber’s 
reliance upon what the people believe or think about the leader.   
Tom Tyler’s article, “Psychological Perspectives On Legitimacy and Legitimation,” also 
discusses the social elements of legitimacy, but presents a more psychological perspective on the 
topic.  He claims that an individual possesses legitimacy if he or she is capable of making others 
defer to decisions and rules out of obligation rather than out of fear of punishment or anticipation 
of reward.43  Although he acknowledges that excessive use of force or coercion can lead others 
to do what a leader wants, it is far easier to maintain social control if a figurehead actually holds 
legitimacy.  He claims that legitimacy convinces individuals to acquiesce voluntarily due to their 
sense of obligation, which is most useful in periods of scarcity, crisis, and conflict.  Tyler also 
mentions how social norms and values can become a part of people’s internal motivational 
systems and guide their behavior.44  As specific social norms and values are internalized, control 
by others become replaced with self-control as these norms become part of one’s own desires 
and guide how they behave.45  Tyler’s work reveals a sense of obligation and responsibility that 
                                                
43 Tyler 378.  
44 Tyler 378.  
45 Tyler 378.  
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arises out of the internalization of certain societal norms and values that can be used to the 
advantage of those in power.  This sense of obligation is what he argues is a key element in the 
concept of legitimacy since it establishes voluntary submissiveness to the directives of 
authoritative figureheads.46   
 
Russian Nationalism 
Astrid Tuminez’s book, Russian Nationalism Since 1856, is an extensive historical 
analysis on Russian nationalism as a consolidating tool in Russian political history and how it 
was employed to mobilize people to action.  The book defines nationalism as a political ideology 
that holds the following beliefs: (1) there exists a nation with identifiable members; (2) the 
nation, as a collective, has characteristics that make it distinct; (3) the individual and the state’s 
highest loyalty must be to the nation’s core interests or mission; and (4) the nation is the chief 
repository of legitimate political authority (2).  According to Tuminez, the term “nation” is a 
concept or category that is used to connote a community of people who share kinship based on 
race, culture, language, ethnicity, religion, and/ or citizenship.47  She argues that nationalism 
implies a consensus between rulers and members of a nation on mutual goals and also plays a 
key role in binding both the state and society effectively together with a common sense of 
identity and purpose.  Due to the fact that the term “nation” holds a conceptual flexibility, it can 
be made into a force that allows leaders to use it as a way to evoke ideas that might best serve 
their aims in a particular political, economic, or cultural context.48  Nationalism’s flexibility also 
                                                
46 Tyler 378. 
47 Tuminez, Astrid S. Russian Nationalism since 1856: Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy. (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000) 2.  
48 Tuminez 3.  
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allows its content and intensity to change over time and under different political and social 
circumstances.49  Tuminez notes that “historical experience, ethnic socialization, cultural 
traditions, and collective memory create a ‘structure of political discourse’ that renders public 
consciousness more susceptible to some nationalist ideas than others and increases the likelihood 
that these ideas will shape social attitudes and actions.”50  Nationalism has legitimating effects 
because it finds its political power within a defined “nation,” and those who claim to represent 
the nation and defend its alleged interests are likely to strengthen their political appeal, increase 
their societal support, and secure their power.51  
Tuminez also notes that her historical analysis of nationalism shows that it has been a 
weak and uneven mobilizing force in Russia.  According to Tuminez, Russian rulers have never 
successfully used nationalism as an ideology to bind state and society in a lasting way.  
Nationalism’s temporal limits are due to the fact that it eventually becomes more difficult to 
harness nationalism for the purposes of the political elite because it loses its appeal to the 
population over time.52  Her analysis of tsarist and Soviet Russian history reveals that when the 
population was mobilized by nationalism to obey orders of the state, make sacrifices that 
preserved ruling regimes, and defend the state from external threat, they usually end up on the 
losing end of the aftermath of nationalist mobilization.  Their concerns are ultimately left 
unaddressed and subordinated to the interests of the ruling elite.53  
 
 
 
                                                
49 Tuminez 3. 
50 Tuminez 4. 
51 Tuminez 4. 
52 Tuminez 3. 
53 Tuminez 267. 
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Popular Support for Undemocratic Regimes 
Richard Rose’s book, Popular Support For An Undemocratic Regime, uses Russia as a 
case study for understanding how undemocratic or semi-democratic regimes have been able to 
mobilize popular support.  They seek to examine how Russians slowly develop support for a 
regime that they see as incongruent with their preference for a complete democracy.  Subjects 
have various reason as to why they support an undemocratic regime and these reasons include: 
they have an honest belief that the government is legitimate and/or they have a resigned 
acceptance of it as an alternative to chaos because it establishes some form of order.  The authors 
also demonstrate that with the passage of time, performance makes evident how a new regime 
differs from its predecessor and the longer it remains in place, the greater the likelihood that its 
subjects will abandon any expectation that it could be replaced.  The ability of the current 
Russian government to overcome the challenges that it encounters over time not only makes it 
durable but it also weakens the population’s hope for any viable alternatives.54  Developing 
viable alternatives to Putin in Russia remains an issue because no one alternative is endorsed by 
a majority and this is prevents the opposition from forming a stable and viable coalition against 
the semi-democratic Russian government.55  
  
         The Chinese Model of Value-based Legitimacy 
Anne-Marie Brady’s article, “Mass Persuasion as a Means of Legitimation and China’s 
Popular Authoritarianism” examines the role of mass persuasion in reclaiming and maintaining 
political legitimacy using an authoritarian Chinese model.  According to Brady, “states 
                                                
54 Rose 91.  
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traditionally maintain power by means of either performance-based legitimacy or promulgating 
ideology.  Mass persuasion can be used to both promote a regime’s ideology and persuade the 
public that it is performing the tasks of government effectively and equitably.”56  She also notes 
that some governments even use a combination of these two to maintain legitimacy.  Brady 
reveals that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has always used mass persuasion as a tool of 
government, but from 1978 to 1989, CCP rule faced a legitimacy crisis.  She notes that many 
critics believed that this legitimacy crisis was the result of the Mao era reforms that were 
enforced and ultimately hindered economic growth.  Brady believes that the CCP’s reliance upon 
economic legitimacy alone was too risky and identified this as the source of the political 
instability that had led up to the 1989 student protest movement.  In response to the protests, the 
CCP chose to base its legitimacy on both economic growth and ideological goals that would then 
be incorporated and perpetuated by methods of mass persuasion.  Starting from 1991, patriotism 
was a key political ideology that the Party included in its mass persuasion campaigns.57  She also 
notes how the party also uses major events such as the Beijing Olympics as a method of “mass 
distraction” designed to mobilize the population and distract them from more troubling issues 
such as inflation, unemployment, political corruption, and environmental degradation.  Due to 
the successful incorporation of ideology into methods of mass persuasion, China continues to be 
a Party-State rather than a multiparty democracy because the CCP government has succeeded in 
                                                
56 Brady, Anne-Marie. “Mass Persuasion as a Means of Legitimation and China’s Popular Authoritarianism.” 
(American Behavioral Scientist (2009) 434.  
 
57 Brady 447.  
 22 
its task of persuading the Chinese population that the current political system is the most 
appropriate one for China today.58  
Ning Liao’s paper, “Bringing Ideology Back In: Chinese Nationalism Contextualized in 
the Legitimacy Enhancement of an Authoritarian Regime,” also discusses how the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) has resorted to using nationalism as an ideological tool for its 
legitimacy enhancement.  Liao seems to agree with Brady and believes that regime legitimacy 
based solely on economic performance is imperfect and needs to be integrated with elements of 
ideology in order to restore order and achieve the population’s validation of authority.  The CCP 
utilizes nationalist discourse to portray the party’s commitment to the Chinese population’s 
interests by exploiting elements present within Chinese culture.  According to Liao, a conceptual 
fallacy exists in the common perception that illegitimacy exists in nations where authoritarian 
governments exist and their only source of survival is coercion and repression.  Even 
authoritarian regimes and semi-democratic regimes need some degree of popular legitimacy to 
sustain their rule because control and coercion can only sustain leaders for a limited time, so they 
ultimately need to ground their claims in some kind of popular support59  Ning Liao argues that 
any regime that can sustain its rule for a long time has legitimacy as long as the population 
continues to accept the right of their leaders to rule.  The author therefore believes that 
nationalism is an effective ideology that can cultivate a sense of political loyalty to the nation-
state, cultural belonging to the community, and can be used as an instrument of regime 
legitimacy enhancement.  Within this context Liao presents the concept of “value-based 
legitimacy” and how the CCP utilizes this in order to effectively evade the Party’s “performance 
dilemma.”  According to Liao, “Nationalism-a distinctive discourse of political culture that 
                                                
58 Brady 452.  
59 Liao 352.  
 23 
draws deeply from the well of national history-is thus selected as a strategy alternative to 
economic performance to legitimize the rule of the authoritarian regime.”   
Liao believes that the moderately high level of belief in the CCP’s regime legitimacy in 
the minds of Chinese citizens today is less a reflection of its policy performance in 
socioeconomic areas, but rather reflective of the regime’s success in framing the population’s 
perceptions within an ideological framework.  He claims that, “even though the Chinese people 
remain discontented with policies implemented by the incumbent authority in certain issue areas, 
the overall subjective evaluation of the regime constitutes a reliable basis of popular support of 
the regime’s rule.”  Liao argues that while performance-based legitimacy still serves as a rightful 
source of the regime’s authority, ideology cannot be treated as an insignificant factor in the 
enhancement of the CCP’s regime legitimacy.  Ultimately, Liao believes that nationalism as an 
official ideology is arguably much more durable than performance-based legitimacy but also 
acknowledges the limits to its sustainability as regimes become dependent upon international 
conflicts and/or events to serve as distractions from the government’s performance-based failures 
(360). 
The works that I have presented within this literature review provided the present 
ongoing conversations concerning the nature of legitimacy, nationalist mobilization, and popular 
support for undemocratic regimes.  The first five works examined one of these three topics 
extensively and the final two works analyzed how these three elements interact with one another 
within the Chinese model.  The theories and claims that these works present matter because they 
form the framework upon which my study will be conducted and help shape my argument.   
Although I agree with David Beetham’s criticism of Weber’s three-fold categorization of 
legitimacy and also agree with the conditions that Beetham presents as an alternative to Weber’s 
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theory, I do believe that Russia is an exception to one condition that Beetham presents.  The case 
of Russia is unique as it relates to the first condition, which states that an authority needs to 
conform to established rules in order to be considered legitimate.  Although the legitimacy of the 
ruling elite in Russia is often questioned when incidents of government corruption come to light, 
the ruling elite somehow still manages to win the expressed consent of constituents after the 
legitimacy crisis.  Beetham’s conditions are correct when these rules are applied to a fully 
democratic state, but in the case of Russia any many other undemocratic regimes like it, not all 
of the conditions that he presents apply because many regimes still find ways to garner popular 
support despite their fallacies.  My study is therefore focused on understanding the strategies 
employed by undemocratic regimes or more specifically Russia in order to retain legitimacy 
when citizens bring its right to rule into question.    
There also seems to be some discord between these authors regarding whether 
government performance or the population’s constructed beliefs about the government are better 
sources of legitimacy.  Although many of these authors seem to acknowledge the importance of 
shared beliefs, social norms, and values in terms of their ability to internally mobilize individuals 
into acquiescing voluntarily to a leader’s rule, opinions differ on if this is a more important 
and/or sustainable source of legitimacy than government performance.  David Beetham seems to 
be in favor of the performance argument because he believes that enhanced order, stability, and 
effectiveness are a better way to assess legitimacy while some of the other authors acknowledge 
the effectiveness of ideology as a substitute for a government’s performance deficit.  Michael 
Hechter does an excellent job of explaining the dynamic between these two sources of legitimacy  
in his journal article, “Legitimacy in the Modern World.”  He claims that although the principal 
determinant of a government’s ruling effectiveness is based upon its ability to provide public 
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goods that will improve the constituent's quality of life, in the absence of state performance and 
fair government procedures, rulers can gain legitimacy by employing ideologies, symbolic 
scripts, and techniques of mass persuasion that can be utilized to “hoodwink” state subjects into 
attaining a “false consciousness.”60  Therefore, value-based legitimacy can lead constituents to 
believe that the government has the right to rule even despite its deficiencies.  
My project fits within the context of the works presented here because I am interested in 
understanding how concepts such as legitimacy, nationalism, and the maintenance of popular 
support interact through the use of value-based legitimacy within today’s Russia.  Many works 
seem to focus on political and economic performance as the basis of legitimacy, but far fewer 
works examine how value-based legitimacy is utilized when a leader can no longer rely upon 
performance legitimacy alone.   The Chinese example has demonstrated how value –based 
legitimacy is a valid and functional source of legitimacy and the works that I have presented 
have proven its usefulness to be true.  Although Tuminez’s work already provides perspective on 
how nationalist ideology was used in tsarist and Soviet Russian history, my study is unique 
because it will analyze nationalism as a legitimacy enhancer in today’s Russia.   My research is 
intended to fill the gap that currently exists concerning the significance of value-based 
legitimacy and its usefulness in securing popular support in times of poor economic and/or 
political performance under the rule of a semi-authoritarian regime.  My study is therefore meant 
to bridge the gap in our understanding of the utilization of value-based legitimacy in the absence 
of government performance through the examination of contemporary Russia as a case study.   
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Chapter 3: Theory 
Drawing from the behavior predicted by the previous works of literature that I just 
presented, this study aims to examine relative events that have occurred in contemporary Russia.  
More specifically, the main question motivating this study is how exactly has Putin been able to 
restore and maintain his legitimacy in his third term following the 2011-2012 protests that 
erupted?  My theoretical argument claims that Putin responded to these protests by changing his 
legitimization strategy from performance to value-based legitimacy and this is what has helped 
him secure his right to rule.  Although there are numerous values that can be associated with 
value-based legitimacy, for the sake of limiting the scope of this thesis, I will be focusing on 
nationalist ideology and other extensions of Russian pride such as traditionalism.   
I acknowledge that nationalism is not a completely foreign concept, but is actually an 
essential element when ruling a nation-state.  The significance of nationalism in this case is 
rooted in the fact that Putin seemed to be utilizing a more benign form of nationalism in his 
previous terms but his actions and rhetoric seem to have taken a more aggressive direction lately.  
When Putin first came into power, he had the benefit of economic stability and had no need to 
seek other modes of generating popular support.  But now, due to changes in the current 
economic state of Russia, I argue that Putin has become more dependent upon appealing to the 
population’s nationalist sentiments in order to maintain his right to rule.  By appealing to 
nationalist sentiment, the population sees Putin’s promotion of national interests as an effective 
mode of conduct and his engagements on the international stage also properly distract the 
population from persisting domestic issues that remain unaddressed and unresolved.  I will not 
necessarily be able to prove that a causational relationship exists between Putin’s actions and his 
ability to re-establish a strong support base, but instead I make an argument for a correlational 
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relationship that exists between how Putin has been able to re-legitimize himself after 
accusations of dissatisfactory performance.   
In order to test my theory and examine whether or not Putin actually has placed a greater 
focus on nationalism in his third term compared to his previous two terms, I decided to analyze 
his State of the Union Addresses to the Federal Assembly.  I chose to examine Putin’s speeches 
because public rhetoric is an excellent method of exerting political influence and these speeches 
will also allow me to examine if and how Putin’s political discourse has changed since his 
comeback.  Leaders use rhetoric in their speeches in order to convey certain ideas and form some 
sort of bond with the population that they are speaking to and these speeches represent just one 
of many methods that Putin’s utilizes to disseminate certain ideas when considering the 
magnitude of his control over mass media.  In order to analyze his speeches, a coding scheme of 
topics of utterance and the word frequency of terms related to these topics were created for 
analysis.  Initially, I only coded for nationalist rhetoric in order to assess word frequencies over 
time, but then I decided to expand my coding to also include other topics related to domestic 
policy such as the economy, environment, social welfare, etc.  By expanding the topics that I 
include in my coding process, I should be able to attain a more comprehensive analysis of 
Putin’s policy agenda and how it has changed over time.  The domestic issues that I have 
included were then categorized as either value-based or performance-based issues.  The logic of 
my assessment of Putin’s speeches is as follows: an increase in word frequency of value-based 
topics would lead me to infer that this is a priority in Putin’s policy agenda while an increase in 
performance-based topics would lead me to conclude that addressing those domestic issues is at 
the top of his agenda.  Through the use of a computerized qualitative analysis program useful for 
analyzing textual and multimedia data, I analyzed all of the State of the Union addresses that 
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Putin has given in his first term, second term, and thus far in his third term.  In order to 
determine whether Putin has indeed chosen to use nationalism as part of his new legitimization 
strategy, I will test the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Putin’s use of nationalist rhetoric will increase in his third term in 
comparison to his previous two terms  
  
Also, in order to have a more comprehensive examination of Putin’s policy agenda and to assess 
whether or not there has been a shift from performance-based legitimacy to value-based 
legitimacy, I shall also test the following hypothesis: 
  
Hypothesis 2: In order to shift the population’s focus and compensate for his performance 
deficit, Putin’s references to government economic and liberal democratic performance 
would also decrease in his third term.   
 
If an increase in the use of nationalist rhetoric in Putin’s third term were found to be true, 
then this would serve to support the argument that he has placed a greater emphasis on appealing 
to the nationalist sentiments of the Russian population in order to restore his legitimacy in his 
third term after the protests.  An increase in the promotion of nationalist ideology will serve to 
demonstrate how he is using nationalism to distract citizens from the government’s performance 
deficit and secure his legitimacy. 
It is also important for me to note that I am not claiming that a government must always 
choose between performance and value-based legitimacy.  In fact, it would be most beneficial to 
achieve support based upon both values and performance.  I do expect this study to reveal 
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whether or not Putin has chosen one source of legitimacy over the other as I have hypothesized 
and also reveal which particular values and areas of performance have mattered the most to him 
since he has taken office.  Before we test the two hypotheses that I have proposed, I will first 
present a few instances that serve to demonstrate why I have been led to believe that Putin has 
pursued more aggressive nationalist promotion strategies in his third presidential term.  
 
   Legitimacy Enhancement Strategies in Putin’s Russia  
What follows is a brief analysis of legitimacy enhancement strategies employed by Putin 
that seem to be rooted in nationalist ideology and Russian traditionalism.  For the purposes of my 
research, I will demonstrate how appealing to these values serve to exhibit Putin’s intent on 
promoting citizen interests so that they will support the current political system.  I will briefly 
discuss how Putin controls narratives through state control of the media, how he has developed a 
strong relationship with the Church (a strong symbol of Russian historical tradition), and I will 
also discuss his recent initiatives on the international stage that are utilized to mobilize 
nationalism and avert attention from current domestic issues.    
 
Control of Media and the Restoration of Putin’s Image: 
 
         It would be remiss of me to discuss Putin’s public oratory without discussing his 
consolidation of the Russian media and its implications on his ability to rule.  Mass media plays 
a very important role in every political system because it has the power to influence popular 
opinion concerning political and societal issues.61  The media serves as a political resource that is 
vital to successfully perpetuating the ideological values that Putin is trying to appeal to.  Ever 
since Putin first became president, according to Markus Soldner, “there [were] no electronic 
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media outlets with nationwide significance and politically relevant content that [were] not 
influenced-either directly or indirectly-by state agents.”62  For example, Pervyi Kanal and 
Rossiia, which are the two TV channels with the largest audience share, happen to be under firm 
state control.63  Other channels with relevant political content are also controlled by people and 
companies loyal to and dependent upon the government.64  Just as the previously mentioned by 
Anne Brady, “mass persuasion can be used to both promote a regime’s ideology and persuade 
the public that it is performing the tasks of government effectively and equitably.”  State-
controlled news narratives not only provides a platform for Putin to disseminate a particular 
narrative to the Russian public but it also allows a certain level of censorship over issues that the 
public is aware of.  Therefore, the media outlet allows Putin to control the presence of certain 
“legitimizing” public narratives.  Putin holds a monopoly over information in Russia and this can 
ultimately influence the population’s perceptions about him and his ability to rule.  In order for 
value-based legitimacy to be completely successful, Putin relies upon controlling and limiting 
free press to advance his arguments for why he is the rightful leader of Russia.  Suppressing 
counterarguments is the only way to ensure that Putin’s appeals to Russian values are not 
exposed as manipulations of Russian public opinion.  Muzzling anti-Putin voices immensely 
enhances his ability to portray both himself and his actions in a more positive light without the 
interference of dissenting voices.  
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Consolidation of the Russian Orthodox Church: 
         Religious values are an important aspect of Russian historical tradition and it is important 
for me to describe the role that religion plays in contemporary Russian politics.  The Russian 
Orthodox Church holds a rich place in Russian history and since the beginning of Putin’s 
presidency in Russia, the lines segregating church and state have become almost 
indistinguishable.  The church finally made a resurgence with the fall of the Soviet Union 
following years of repression that began after the Bolshevik Revolution.  After the 
socioeconomic insecurity of the 1990s drew crowds of Russians back toward the dwindling 
institution, the Russian Orthodox Church was finally able to reestablish its central role in 
Russian society and politics.65  Ever since, the Church has enjoyed a growing influence and 
relevance in Russian culture that hark back to the Russian imperial era.66   Recent polls show that 
74% of Russians consider themselves part of the Russian Orthodox Church, so it therefore 
becomes easy to understand why Putin would want to develop close ties with the church while 
ruling over an increasingly pious Russian society.67  Recently, Putin seems to be establishing a 
close relationship between himself and leader of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, 
who in 2012 once called Putin a “miracle from God,” who rectified the “crooked path of 
history.”68  Patriarch Kirill’s public glorification of Putin is a symbolic reflection upon imperial 
Russian tradition in which the state had close ties to the church and power was bestowed by God 
himself with the support of the church.69  Not only is Putin’s role as the head of the Russian 
government thus validated by his close relationship to the patriarch but the patriarch also serves 
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to gain from this relationship because he needs Putin’s support in order to continue exercising his 
power.70  This collaboration works because both sides have something to gain from this 
partnership – legitimacy and political clout.71  In fact, Patriarch Kirill was granted residence in 
the Kremlin back in 2011, after he supported Vladimir Putin’s bid for a third term in office. This 
move restores the church to the offices it once occupied before the 1917 revolution.72  These 
events serve to illustrate the historical ties that the Orthodox Church has to Russian tradition and 
demonstrate how appeals to popular religious values serve to benefit Putin and secure his support 
base. 
 
Strategies on the International Stage: 
 Internationally, Putin has sought to reestablish Russia as a major player in foreign affairs 
and what follows is a brief description of key events that I believe have boosted nationalist 
morale and have helped shape the population’s perceptions about Putin’s ability to effectively 
promote national interests in the international arena. 
 
Russia’s Annexation of Crimea and Ukrainian Destabilization: 
         Putin’s actions regarding the Ukrainian crisis and the Crimean annexation can be seen as 
attempts to exhibit his dedication to the promotion and protection of Russian interests abroad 
because Crimea is a region with an ethnic Russian majority, it contains Russia’s Black Sea Fleet 
military unit, and demonstrates Putin’s recovery of historic Russian territory.  The Kremlin’s 
involvement in the annexation of Crimea ultimately served to create a “rally around the flag” 
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effect and boost national solidarity.  The current destabilization of Ukraine also benefits Putin 
because, according to Henry Hale, “ [it] nicely fit a narrative Putin has long been weaving that 
revolutions — and protests that might develop into them — are fraught with the danger of state 
failure and territorial dismemberment. These are messages that serve him well at home, at least, 
for now.”73  The current situation in Ukraine serves as a warning against any future uprisings that 
might occur against his rule at home in Russia.   
 The current economic situation in Russia as a result of its involvement in Crimea and the 
Ukraine is dismal at best as Russia deals with fleeing investors, plummeting oil prices, and 
Western-imposed economic sanctions.74  High levels of inflation in food prices also resulted after 
Russia banned certain foods from Europe and the U.S. in response to the Western sanctions.75  
Even though Putin’s actions in Crimea and the Ukraine have accelerated Russia’s economic 
depression and undermines national interests instead of promoting them, Putin’s control of mass 
media allows him to reconcile this contradiction by placing the blame for their misfortune on the 
West.  Instead of taking the blame for the role he has played in the further deterioration of the 
Russian economy, he has managed to shift the blame onto the West by characterizing their 
economic sanctions as acts of Western aggression against Russia.  Public Western condemnation 
of Russia’s involvement in Crimea and the Ukraine also serve to support Putin’s argument 
concerning Western aggression and deflects blame away from Putin.   
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Sochi Olympics: 
The 2014 Winter Sochi Olympics were a convenient international sports event that also 
boosted nationalist sentiment and portrayed Russia as a great power on the international stage.76  
Hosting the Olympics provided an excellent platform to put Russian greatness on display and 
generate strong national pride.  According to Emil & Bo Petersson, “the Sochi Olympics [meant] 
a renewed chance of displaying vigor and strength, and to project this image internally as well as 
externally.”77  This sporting event helped revive national pride and stimulated nostalgic 
memories of the 1980 Summer Olympics which were held in Moscow at a time when the Soviet 
Union was at the pinnacle of its power.78   According to Makarychev and Mommen, “The 
authorities are trying to compensate for the absence of visible social and economic development 
with spectacular achievements such as the organization of world summits such as sports events 
like the Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014.79  
  
     Syria: 
Putin’s capacity to present Russia as a leader in the international arena was also 
demonstrated by his actions during the Syrian crisis.80  In response to the Syrian government’s 
use of chemical weapons against civilians back in 2013, Putin pushed for a diplomatic approach 
to resolving this issue in order to protect his Syrian ally President Bashar Assad and also thwart 
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U.S. efforts to intervene militarily.81  Ultimately, the parties involved agreed to work towards a 
diplomatic solution as Putin had originally proposed.  This was a massive diplomatic triumph 
because Putin was able to effectively aid the peaceful dismantling of Syrian chemical weapons 
while averting Western military assault on the country.82  This international success helped 
Russia protect its interests in Syria and also assume the role of a global peacemaker by 
preventing the further bloodshed in Syria that could have resulted from military intervention.83  
According to Richard Sakwa, “His triumph in Syria provided confidence in Putin’s ability to 
bring Russia as a powerful and influential contender on the international stage and proved his 
ability to make decisions independent of the U.S. and be successful in pursuing Russian interests 
without following the lead of the U.S. or being a Western puppet.”84  Putin’s ability to outsmart 
the West in terms of finding a solution to the Syrian chemical weapons crisis was a monumental 
feat especially since the U.S. usually assumes the role as international peacemaker.  Russia’s 
ability to act independently of the U.S.’s influence also caters to the notion of Russian 
exceptionalism and the traditional pursuit of a unique Russian path.  According to Putin, 
intervention in Ukraine was necessary and legitimate while military intervention in Syria was out 
of the question.85  These are not issues of principle but rather strategic moves to mobilize the 
population through the advancement of Russian interests.86  In addition, Russia also thwarted the 
West by granting asylum to Edward Snowden in the same year as the Syrian crisis.  Regardless 
of whether or not Russia actually extracted information from Snowden, their possession of him 
                                                
81 Simon, Shuster. “Russia Celebrates a Triumph for Putin After Clinching Syria Deal.” Time Magazine. N.p., 2014. 
Print. 
82 Sakwa 202.  
83 Shuster  
84 Sakwa 202. 
85 Bullough  
86 Bullough  
 36 
symbolizes the acquisition of a resource that could work to the advantage of Russia.  Not only 
did he pull these strategic moves off swiftly but also with a certain finesse that was sure to win 
over the respect of the Russian population.   
In September 2013, after Putin’s triumphs with Syria and Snowden, Putin delivered a 
speech at the Valdai International Discussion Club, which is an international discussion forum in 
which leading foreign experts gather to engage in dialogue with Russia’s leaders.  The speech 
that he delivered that year exhibited a reinvigoration of national pride after these international 
successes.87  Within the speech, Putin emphasized the need of new strategies ‘to preserve our 
identity in a rapidly changing world and stressed that “the question of finding and strengthening 
national identity really is fundamental for Russia.”88  Putin argued against copying other 
country’s experiences and rejected attempts to “civilize Russia from abroad” and instead stressed 
that “the desire for independence and sovereignty in spiritual, ideological, and foreign policy 
spheres is an integral part of our national character.”89  He ended his speech with the argument 
that after the many tribulations of the post-communist era since 1991, Russia was finally 
“returning to itself, to its own history.”90  Richard Sakwa characterized this speech as having a 
traditionalist message while containing a level of conservatism and a developmental strategy that 
stressed its autonomous values and direction.91  According to Sakwa, “in detail it was 
convincing, but when placed in the overall context of the economic and political challenges 
facing the country, it represented a partial and ineffective model for the future.”92  One important 
aspect of the speech to note is the fact that it also exhibited the type of nationalism that Putin is 
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promoting.  Putin explains, “Russia was formed specifically as a multi-ethnic and multi-
confessional country from its very inception.  Nationalists must remember that by calling into 
question our multi-ethnic character, and exploiting the issue of Russian, Tatar, Caucasian, 
Siberian, or any other nationalism or separatism, means that we are starting to destroy our 
genetic code.  In effect, we will begin to destroy ourselves.  Russia’s sovereignty, independence 
and territorial integrity are unconditional.”93  This was an attempt to prevent a divisive ethnic 
form of nationalism from taking hold of the country and disrupting the country’s united front.  
 
 
Chapter 4: Testing the Theory 
Up until this point, I have presented events that have alluded to a more aggressive form 
of nationalist mobilization in Putin’s third term as a way to re-establish and maintain his 
legitimacy.  This section will now serve the purpose of putting these assumptions to the test.  
Therefore, I shall be examining Putin’s State of the Union addresses in order to analyze how 
Putin’s political language has changed over time.  Analyzing the content of these speeches will 
provide insight on what issues and topics are at the top of Putin’s policy agenda and should 
reveal how the dynamic between value-based appeals and domestic economic and political issues 
change over the course of his three presidential terms.  The content of these speeches will also 
reveal the topics that Putin aims to focus the public’s attention upon.  More importantly, it will 
allow me to test my theory and determine two things: (1) if nationalist rhetoric has increased in 
his third term relative to his previous terms and 2) if Putin’s references to government economic 
and liberal democratic performance truly have decreased in his third term, in order to shift the 
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population’s focus and compensate for his performance deficit.  What follows is a brief 
description of the methodology utilized to conduct this study and a presentation of the data that I 
collected.  
 
Methodology 
Content Analysis 
Content analysis was the primary method of data collection utilized in this study.  My 
content analysis was directed at eleven of the State of the Union addresses that Putin has 
delivered between 2000 and 2014 with individual key terms as the unit of analysis.  The 
speeches were coded into a software program called ATLAS.ti 7, which is commonly used for 
coding and interpreting textual and multimedia data.  This software was utilized in order to 
identify the existence of certain key terms.  Computer-assisted content analysis is preferred over 
manual analysis because computerized programs ensure reliability and replicability.  This 
method also provides a more accurate and unbiased platform in which one can conduct both 
quantitative and qualitative operations.  
I opted to study Putin’s State of the Union addresses primarily because these speeches are 
directed to a Russian audience.  These speeches will provide insight on the appeals that he makes 
and serve to reveal how Putin’s policy agenda changes over time.  Content analysis will allow 
me to quantify and analyze the presence of certain words and/or concepts in order to make 
inferences about patterns regarding Putin’s political priorities.94  In order to conduct this content 
analysis, the speeches were coded into 2 main conceptual categories: 1) Performance and 2) 
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Values.  The key methodological question of this study was determining what terms would be 
associated with “performance” and what terms would be associated with “values.”  I decided to 
categorize terms that were meant to appeal to Russian tradition and/or boost nationalism as 
“values”, while terms associated with domestic political and economic performance were 
categorized under “performance.”  The “performance” category had thirteen subcategories such 
as macroeconomic issues, civil rights, social welfare, law and crime, energy, etc.  These 
subcategories are meant to reflect typical domestic issues and topics that Putin may address.  The 
“values” subcategories include nationalism and other subcategories that could boost nationalism 
and traditionalist sentiment such as national security, references to past Russian history, and 
references to Russian Orthodoxy/spirituality, etc.  Although I acknowledge that issues of national 
security can equally be considered as a performance-related topic, I opted to associate it with 
nationalist values because issues of national security tend to boost nationalist morale.  A 
codebook with a full list of terms that projected each of these subcategories was then generated.  
(The full codebook can be found in the appendix section).  
          Content analysis can be broken down into two categories: conceptual analysis and 
relational analysis.95  Content analysis simply establishes the existence and frequency of 
concepts most represented by words or phrases in a text, while relational analysis identifies what 
other words the key terms that I have identified appear next to, in order to determine the different 
meanings that emerge as a result of these groupings.96  Conceptual analysis simply involves 
choosing certain concepts for examination by quantifying and tallying its presence, while 
relational analysis is a more in-depth analysis of the derived meanings of word or phrase 
                                                
95 “Content Analysis” 3.  
96 “Content Analysis” 3.  
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groupings.97  Therefore, it is important for me to note that relational analysis was not utilized in 
this study for the sake of conducting a more objective and replicable method of analysis.   
 
Coding Procedures: How to determine words to include in codebook 
Due to the fact that no relevant dataset had existed prior to this study, I must thoroughly 
explain all of the coding procedures employed in order to ensure transparency and replicability 
of this study’s findings.  The codebook that can be found in the Appendix was generated using 
terms extracted from a publicly available dataset, which was derived from the word frequency 
analysis of U.S. State of the Union addresses dating back to George Washington.  This dataset 
aided in the generation of my codebook because it allowed me to determine topics that are 
commonly discussed in State of the Union addresses.  In addition to this, I also included some 
terms from The University of Texas at Austin’s Policy Agenda Project codebook (see Appendix) 
because it also included numerous topics commonly discussed in political speeches.  Each of the 
terms derived from these two sources were then associated with one of the specific subcategories 
that I previously mentioned.  
 
Coding Procedures: How to code in Atlas.ti 7 
The English translations of Putin’s State of the Union addresses were extracted from 
Putin’s presidential website and were uploaded into Atlas.ti 7.  Codes for each category and 
subcategory were then generated.  Afterwards, I randomly selected 3 speeches to read in order to 
account for certain discrepancies in the way that Putin spells certain terms and the manner that I 
have spelled them as an American.  I noticed that Putin would spell certain words differently 
                                                
97 “Content Analysis” 3. 
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from traditional American spellings, for instance, he used terms such as “labour” instead of 
“labor”, “rouble” instead of “ruble”, and “defence” instead of “defense” along with a few other 
noted differences.  Therefore, I decided to include both spellings of these words for a more 
comprehensive study.  Then, I input a list of terms to be associated with each subcategory and 
coded them into the program.  For thoroughness, I had the program search for the root words of 
some terms in order to include all variations of particular words that might have multiple 
endings.  So for example I would input “econom-” as a root word in the program and it would 
search for words with similar roots such as economy, economic, economies, etc. This makes for 
a more inclusive analysis of the text.  After all speeches had been coded, the accumulated data 
was then extrapolated onto an Excel spreadsheet in order to analyze the word frequencies related 
to each category over time. What follows is a presentation of the data that was accumulated.  
 
            Data 
Figure 1: Word frequency of performance and value terms within 2000-2014 speeches 
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      Figure 2: Economic Word Frequency Over Time 
 
 
 
 
     Figure 3: Liberal Democracy Word Frequency Over Time 
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Figure 4: Nationalism Word Frequency Over Time 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Putin’s Top Three Policy Agendas Over Time  
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Data Analysis and Discussion 
Before data accumulation began, I presented the following two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Putin’s use of nationalist rhetoric will increase in his third term in  
comparison to his previous two terms  
               and  
Hypothesis 2: In order to shift the population’s focus and compensate for his performance  
deficit, Putin’s references to government economic and liberal 
democratic performance would also decrease in his third term.   
 
My findings as demonstrated by figure 4, seem to support hypothesis 1 because they 
reveal that Putin’s use of nationalist rhetoric actually peaked at the beginning of Putin’s third 
term in 2012.  In addition, Putin’s references to the past and his references to religion also 
peaked in 2012 as seen in figure 1.  Although nationalism and the other values did increase at the 
beginning of Putin’s third term as I had predicted, I was surprised to see that they did not remain 
consistently high in the years that followed.  This slight decline may be due to the fact that his 
dependence upon value-based appeals were no longer as vital to his regime’s survival as they 
once were back in 2012 when the protests still posed a threat to his rule.   
         Not all of my findings seemed to support my hypotheses however as demonstrated by 
figure 2 which shows that Putin’s references to economic performance did not decline in his 
third term.  I expected that he would decrease his references to government economic 
performance in addition to increasing value-based rhetoric as a way to deflect from his 
government’s performance deficit, but this was proven to be incorrect.  In fact, data from figure 
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5 shows how the economy consistently remained a top priority on Putin’s agenda.  This serves to 
indicate that although Putin may have increased his use of value-based rhetoric to help bolster 
popular support, he also held a consistent interest in discussing the economy.  In fact, according 
to figure 2, the year 2012 was actually an instance in which he had the second highest number of 
references to economic performance.  These findings suggest that although Putin may have tried 
to compensate for the lack of economic performance with a greater emphasis on nationalist 
rhetoric, he did not completely deflect from discussing economic issues as I had previously 
suggested.  Although I did not believe that Putin would completely ignore pressing issues such as 
the dwindling economy, I did expect economic and value-based rhetoric to have a more inversely 
proportional relationship that would demonstrate his efforts to shift the focus from issues that he 
has yet to alleviate, to issues in which he seems to be making progress.  It is possible that in the 
absence of a strong economy, Putin resorted to making economic promises and presenting 
economic initiatives in his speeches as a way to show that he has plans to improve the economic 
situation in Russia.  This reveals that a leader cannot completely deflect from persisting domestic 
issues but instead has to convince their constituents that they have a plan for change in the future 
in the absence of good performance in the present.  Therefore, Putin’s new legitimization 
strategy does not involve using values to completely mask the current lack of economic 
performance as I had suggested.  These findings suggest that Putin did not transform from one 
source of legitimacy to another, but instead has altered the degree in which he has relied upon 
these sources.  Putin’s third term is distinct because he could no longer rely upon economic 
performance to secure popular support but instead relied upon promises of economic prosperity 
in addition to an increased use of nationalist rhetoric.  So I was correct in claiming that there was 
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a change in his legitimization strategy, but was incorrect in determining what exactly this change 
was.  
         Interestingly, the results regarding liberal democratic performance were somewhat 
inconclusive as displayed by figure 3.  Similar to my predictions for economic performance, I 
expected to find a more distinguished decrease in references to establishing a liberal democracy 
in Putin’s third term as another way to deflect from the issues and refocus the population’s 
attention on other topics.  I cannot draw any clear conclusions regarding whether his references 
in his third term have increased or decreased relative to his first two terms because the changes 
are not as drastic as I would have expected, but I will say that relative to the last two speeches 
that he delivered in his second term, his references to liberal democracy in 2012 seem to have 
slightly increased.  This may be due to the fact that he wants to seem as if he is addressing the 
grievances of protesters concerning government corruption, administering free and fair elections, 
and the protection of certain freedoms.  This assumption also seems to be supported by the spike 
in liberal democratic rhetoric evident in the speech that he delivered in 2005 (see figure 3).  The 
fact that this speech was delivered not too long after the beginning of the color revolutions and 
directly after the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, leads me to believe that he sought to address 
the issue of his government’s democratic deficit in order to prevent a revolution from taking 
place within Russia.  So it is very possible that under the threat of revolution and protests, Putin 
attempts to portray his government as being more responsive to citizen grievances, even though 
in reality he has no incentive to make any real changes because the implementation of a true 
liberal democracy would ultimately only serve to limit his power.   
My findings seem to suggest that the most common priorities on Putin’s agenda seem to 
be the economy, national security, and nationalism as exemplified by figure 5.  This is the 
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predominant trend over the course of Putin’s three terms, but there are some instances in which 
other topics make it to the top of Putin’s policy agenda.  For example, in the years 2001, 2002, 
and 2005, law and order seem to have become an issue that Putin deemed a priority to address.  
Another interesting trend to note is the fact that education and banking have also managed to 
make it into the top of Putin’s policy agenda during his third term.  
Despite the observations that content analysis of Putin’s speeches present regarding 
changes in Putin’s policy agenda over time, this method does not fully explain why the 
population chooses to support a semi-authoritarian leader amidst a failing economy and other 
lingering domestic issues.  In order to provide perspective on the Russian population’s opinions 
regarding Putin’s performance as a leader and his right to rule, I will now present some relevant 
survey data.   
 
Understanding the Basis of Putin’s Support 
Analysis of survey data was also utilized within this study in order to understand the 
reasoning behind the Russian population’s support for Putin and how they evaluate his 
leadership performance thus far.  The survey data that I will present was collected by the 
Levada-Center which is an independent Russian non-governmental research organization.  It 
was important for me to gather survey data from an independent research group because it 
provides authentic citizen responses that have not been directly manipulated or influenced by the 
government.  The following survey data was collected by the Levada-Center in the fall months of 
2014 and they shall reveal how constituents evaluate Putin’s rule as president of Russia.   
When prompted with the following question, “With which of the evaluations of Putin as 
President of Russia would you be inclined to agree?” the most popular response was “I fully 
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share Putin's views and positions,” while 23% replied “I am ready to support Putin, as long as he 
carries out democratic and market reforms in Russia.” Only 17% responded “I support Putin due 
to the absence of other worthy politicians” (see table 1).  According to a another nationwide 
survey conducted by the Levada-Center (see table 2), when asked “In which of the following 
actions was Putin least successful?,” a majority of claimed that he was least successful in 
fighting corruption while other responses reveal how some believe that Putin was also 
unsuccessful in increasing the standard of living (15%), limiting the influence of oligarchs 
(15%), strengthening of morals (13%), and economic development (11%).  This survey reveals 
the main issues that the citizens of Russia still want Putin to address and it also reveals how 
aware constituents are of specific policy issues that Putin has failed to resolve.  These findings 
also suggest that the Russian population is not completely oblivious to the issues that remain and 
their recognition of Putin’s failures dismisses speculation of a possible cult of personality as 
justification for his high levels of popular support.  In fact, when asked if there was a cult of 
personality surrounding Vladimir Putin in Russia (see table 3), a majority of respondents 
answered “no, there are no signs of such a cult” while 31% of respondents claimed “not yet, but 
the preconditions for a cult of personality are growing.”  If a cult of personality does not 
presently exist within Putin’s Russia, then why exactly does he have such a strong support base 
right now?  The majority of responses to the question “Why do you think so many people trust 
Vladimir Putin” reveal that many people are convinced that Putin resolves problems successfully 
and with dignity and they hope that, in the future, Putin will be able to resolve the country's 
current problems (see table 4).  The population seems to place a lot of trust in Putin and they 
believe that despite the current dismal situation in Russia, Putin is a leader that is capable of 
leading them towards a brighter and more prosperous future.   
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Even more revealing are responses to the prompt: “Do you really believe that Putin is 
concerned about seriously improving people’s lives, or do his words represent the typical empty 
promises that all politicians make?”  A surprising majority responded that, “Putin sincerely 
wants to improve the well-being of the population, but he cannot do this because of bureaucratic 
pushback and the absence of a good team” while the second highest response was that “Putin 
sincerely wants to improve the well-being of the population, and he will be able to succeed in the 
next 6 years.”  Surprisingly, only 15% responded, “Putin often says the right things, but he does 
not follow through on what he promises” (see table 5).  
The final survey that I will present demonstrates how popular opinion regarding Putin’s 
accomplishments have changed over time.  This survey contains a series of responses to 
questions concerning “Putin’s accomplishments during his years in power” and responses in 
March 2004 after Putin’s first presidential term showed that respondents believed that his 
greatest accomplishments were, “improving the quality of life of citizens, salary and pension 
growth,” and “increasing optimism and hope for a quick improvement of the way things stand in 
the country” (see table 6).  When the same question was asked in March 2014, during his third 
term, the most popular responses were “strengthening Russia’s position in the international 
arena,”  “establishing order in the country, ensuring a calm political environment”, and 
“strengthening Russia’s military capability, reforming the armed forces.”  The transition from the 
2004 responses regarding improving the quality of life to the 2014 responses regarding Russia’s 
position in the international arena, established order, and strengthening military capability also 
lead me to infer that his use of nationalist rhetoric has had some level of influence in terms of 
finding other sources of legitimacy.  The strategies that Putin has employed thus far to repair his 
image have proven to be somewhat effective as revealed by the survey data.  There seems to be a 
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correlation between the ideas that Putin has been trying to disseminate and the responses that I 
have presented in this section.   
 
Sources of Error in Methodology: 
         There are a few benefits and drawbacks to the coding procedures that I employed in order 
to conduct this study.  In order to maintain objectivity, I chose to not hand code the speeches 
when accumulating data on word frequency, but there are some limits to using computer-assisted 
content analysis instead.  The program that I used only coded for the presence of certain words 
but did not attribute any meaning to them therefore relational analysis was not conducted in this 
study.  This is a possible source of error because computerized analysis takes away the ability to 
contextualize each word in relation to other words.  Therefore, there are some words that may 
have been coded under a specific subcategory but may have meant an entirely different thing if 
analyzed within the context of the sentence that it was in.  So for example, the term “customs” 
was coded to mean “commercial trade” but this same term within the right context could also 
imply “customary traditions” instead.  Therefore the context can always change the meaning of 
specific terms.  Although using a computer program allowed me to maintain objectivity and 
prevented the projection of my own biases when collecting and interpreting data, this method 
contains a certain level of inflexibility because I was limited to only coding for words and was 
unable to code for certain phrases that could have also represented a specific theme or topic.  
Common phrases such as references to a “Greater Russia” which is a common political 
aspiration for Russian nationalists, was left uncoded because the program I used was limited to 
words and excluded phrases.  Therefore there may have been plenty of other phrases that were 
left unrecognized by the program and this may have influenced the data results.  
 51 
         As previously mentioned, I had the program detect terms on the basis of root words in 
order to have a more comprehensive data accumulation.  But in an attempt to have a more 
thorough analysis, this method may have also lead to the inclusion of certain terms that may have 
shared the same root but should not have been incorporated into the data.   
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
In summation, this thesis was inspired by the events that have taken place in 
contemporary Russia in response to the 2011-2012 protests and legitimacy crisis.  The political 
question and phenomenon motivating this project thus became: How exactly has Putin been able 
to restore and maintain his legitimacy in the eyes of the Russian people in the midst of a failing 
economy and as many of the protester's original grievances continue to go unaddressed?  
Building upon previous scholarly works, I argued that Putin’s shift from performance-
based to value-based legitimacy has aided him in retaining his right to rule over Russia.  More 
specifically, I argued that in order to mediate the absence of economic prosperity and fair 
government practices, Putin resorted to using value-based discourse to portray his commitment 
to the Russian population’s interests and exploited elements of Russian political culture to his 
advantage.  This was a tactic that helped him pivot the Russian population’s attention from his 
economic and democratic deficiencies to other areas of appeal such as those on the international 
stage.   
Empirical methods were then employed in order to assess whether or not Putin has indeed 
focused on utilizing value-based legitimacy as a substitute and distraction for his performance 
deficit.  The results of content analysis of his State of the Union addresses revealed that Putin’s 
use of nationalist rhetoric did in fact increase at the beginning of his third term in addition to 
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other traditionalist appeals such as his references to the past and religion.  These findings 
supported my first hypothesis and demonstrated that Putin did in fact alter his policy agenda to 
some degree at the beginning of his third term.  Unfortunately, not all of my findings supported 
my theory because my second hypothesis was proven to be incorrect by the fact that economic 
performance was consistently at the top of Putin’s policy agenda in every speech that he 
delivered.  His economic references did not decrease in his third term as I had expected which 
reveals that although Putin did increase his value-based rhetoric to compensate for his 
performance deficit, he did not completely divert attention away from present issues.  These 
findings suggest that Putin did not solely rely upon value-based legitimacy to solve his 
legitimacy crisis, but his new strategy was instead a hybrid of increased value-based appeals in 
addition to a rather consistent focus on improving economic performance.  This reveals that a 
leader cannot completely refrain from addressing persistent domestic issues but instead has to 
convince their constituents that they have a plan for change in the future in the absence of good 
performance in the present.  Therefore, Putin’s legitimacy strategy seems to depend upon both 
domestic performance in political and economic areas in addition to framing the population’s 
perceptions within an ideological framework. This legitimization strategy is quite similar to 
those employed by the Chinese Communist Party back when it also faced a legitimacy crisis. 
Despite the observations that this data presents regarding changes and shifts in Putin’s 
policy agenda over time, I decided to incorporate survey data in order to understand the rationale 
of individuals who continue to support a semi-authoritarian leader amidst a failing economy and 
other domestic issues.  Analysis of survey data revealed that the population is not completely 
oblivious to the persistent problems in Russia because they claim that Putin is least successful in 
fighting corruption, increasing the standard of living, among many other issues.  Therefore, in 
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the case of Russia, citizens have not necessarily been “hoodwinked” into a “false consciousness” 
as Michael Hechter and I had proposed.  Respondents to the surveys seem to place a lot of trust 
in Vladimir Putin because they are convinced that Putin is capable of resolving the country’s 
problems successfully and they believe that he will be able to resolve the country's issues in the 
near future.  A comparison of 2004 and 2014 responses to questions regarding Putin’s 
accomplishments seemed to suggest a correlation between Putin’s increased utilization of value-
based rhetoric and the basis of his popular support.  The transition from the 2004 responses 
regarding his ability to improve citizen quality of life to the nationalist-tinged 2014 responses 
lead me to infer that his use of nationalist rhetoric seems to have had a positive effect in shaping 
popular opinion and may have aided his reconsolidation of legitimacy following the 2011-2012 
protests.   
Some of the works that I had previously presented within my literature review proposed 
theories concerning how authoritarian governments restore and maintain legitimacy after periods 
of crisis.  Some authors believe that performance-based legitimacy is the proper source of 
legitimacy and Putin’s consistent use of economic performance references proves this to be true.  
Regardless of this outcome, one cannot deny how value-based legitimacy can serve as a useful 
legitimacy enhancer in periods of uncertainty.  Despite the current success that Putin seems to be 
having through this method, past tsarist and Soviet Russian history reveal the inevitable temporal 
limits of nationalist mobilization.  Russian history has demonstrated how it tends to weaken over 
time because the population usually ends up on the losing end of the aftermath and their concerns 
are ultimately left unaddressed and subordinated to the interests of the ruling elite.  Only time 
will tell how long Putin will be able to maintain the nationalist campaign that he is on before it 
loses its effectiveness.   
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      Limits of Study and Future Research:   
 
 This study was limited by temporal constraints in the sense that the political phenomenon 
under examination is still pretty recent and many surveys that serve to assess levels of 
nationalism and other values within the Russian population are still being conducted.  In 
addition, the number of published resources that relate to the phenomenon under examination are 
also pretty limited.  Therefore, this study was unable to prove that a causational relationship 
exists and only implies a correlational relationship between Putin’s use of rhetoric and the 
population’s internalization of his ideas, as revealed by the survey data that I presented.  This 
study was conducted and bound within the Russian context but it is also possible that the 
methods utilized within this study can also be applied other case studies.  The limitations that I 
have presented reveal the boundaries of my study but can also serve as jump off points to inspire 
future research.  
 
 
“The core, the binding fabric of this unique civilization – is the Russian people, Russian culture.” -Vladimir 
Putin (2012)  
 
“This civilizational identity is based on preservation of Russian cultural dominance, which is not only 
carried by ethnic Russians, but all carriers of this identity regardless of nationality,” –Vladimir Putin 
(2012)  
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Table 6:  
 
Vladimir Putin’s accomplishments during his years in power: 
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Coding Scheme for Content Analysis of Putin’s State of the Union 
Addresses: 
 
*Not all associated terms in codebook required the use of root words  
* Many terms were derived from: 1) Dataset extracted from the University of California's 
American Presidency Project and 2) The University of Texas at Austin’s Policy Agenda Project 
topic codebook 
 
Category: Subcategory: Associated Terms:  Root Words: 
 
Code: 
Performance  
 
Economy economy, recession, 
development, 
inflation, budget, 
taxes, deficit,  
exports, imports, 
industry, revenue, 
manufacturing, 
fiscal, austerity, 
privatisation, 
productivity, income, 
prices, costs, 
monetary, savings,  
treasury,  debt, 
commodity, 
consumption, rouble, 
ruble, real-estate  
econom-, recession-, 
development-, inflat-, 
budget-, tax-, deficit-
, export-, import-, 
industr-, revenue-, 
manufactur-,privat-
,produc-, income-, 
price-, cost-, mone-
,saving-, debt-, 
commodit-, consum-,  
Perf_economy 
Values National 
security 
 
security, military, 
defence, defense, 
war, enemy, power, 
strength, territory, 
threat, external,  
aggression, attack, 
borders, terrorists, 
missile  
secur-, militar-, 
defen-, war-, enem-, 
territor-, threat-, 
attack-, terrorist-, 
missile- 
Val_nationalism_s
ecurity 
Values  Nationalism nation, common, 
values, patriotism, 
together, unity, 
enemy, community, 
sovereignty, 
dominance, ideology, 
culture, 
nation-, value-, 
patriot-, unit-, enem-, 
communit-, 
sovereig-, dominan-, 
ideolog-, culture-, 
independen-, identit-, 
tradition-, expan-, 
Val_nationalism 
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independence, 
identity, traditional, 
pride, empire, 
expansion, 
superiority, 
exceptionalism, 
encroachment, 
distinguish, accord, 
proud, unique 
 
superior- 
Value  References to 
the Past 
Past, history, Soviet, 
restoration, 
civilization, memory, 
memorial, 
achievements, 
legacy, Peter (the 
Great), Catherine 
(the Great), Cold 
(War), art,  roots  
histor-, restor-, 
civiliz-, memor-, 
legac-,  
Val_nationalism_
past 
Performance Rights and 
Liberties 
freedom, inequities, 
equality, rights, 
minority, 
discrimination,  
freedom-, inequ-, 
right-, minorit-, 
discriminat-,  
Perf_rights 
Performance  Health health, 
immunization, 
tuberculosis, 
malnutrition, 
medical, disease, 
mortality, morbidity 
 
health-, immuniz- Perf_health 
Performance  Agriculture agriculture, agrarian, 
farm,  land  
 
agricultur-, farm- Perf_agriculture 
Performance Labor  labour, labor, 
employment,  job, 
pension, retirement, 
layoffs, wage, salary 
 
employ-, job-, salar- Perf_labor 
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Performance  Education student, teacher,  
school, university 
student-, teach-, 
school-, universit- 
Perf_education 
Performance  Environment environment, 
conservation,contami
nation, pesticide, air, 
(global) warming, 
greenhouse 
(emissions), ozone 
recycling, resources, 
reserves  
environment-, 
conserv-, contamin-, 
resource-, reserve- 
Perf_ environment  
Performance  Energy energy, gas, oil, 
nuclear 
hydroelectric, 
renewable 
N/A Perf_environment  
Performance Law and crime criminal, crime, law  
justice, mob, mafia, 
corruption, 
racketeering, 
gambling, 
counterfeit, fraud, 
laundering, drugs, 
narcotics, legal, 
illegal 
 
criminal-, crime, 
corrupt-, launder-  
Perf_law 
Performance Social 
Welfare: 
low-income, poverty, 
assistance, 
homelessness 
homeless- Perf_social 
Performance Banking and 
Finance: 
insurance, 
bankruptcy, 
commerce, savings, 
loan, investment, 
capital, 
bankrupt-, commerc-, 
loan-, invest-, 
entrepeneur- 
Perf_banking 
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entrepreneurs,  
 
Performance  Immigration immigration,  
refugee,  
resettlement, visa  
 
immigra-, refugee-  Perf_immigration 
Performance Foreign Trade trade, tariff, customs, 
duty-free  
tariff-, custom- Perf_trade 
Values Religion religion, church, 
Orthodox, 
christianity  
N/A Val_religion 
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